Nagarjuna's logic by Johannes, Bronkhorst
Någårjuna's logic  1 
 
 
 January 2, 2009 
JOHANNES BRONKHORST 
 
Någårjuna's logic*  
(published in: Bauddhavidyåsudhåkara˙. Studies in Honour of Heinz Bechert on the Occasion of His 
65th Birthday. Ed. Petra Kieffer-Pülz and Jens-Uwe Hartmann. Swisttal-Odendorf: Indica et Tibetica 
Verlag. (IndTib 30.) 1997. Pp. 29-37) 
 
Some years ago CLAUS OETKE published several articles1 dealing with the arguments 
and teaching of Någårjuna's MËlamadhyamakakårikås (MMK) and Vigrahavyåvartan¥ 
(VV). In these articles he corrected a number of mistaken notions that existed in 
connection with these texts, and analysed their most important arguments. He dedicated 
a whole article to one type of argument, which recurs frequently in Någårjuna's work.2 
This article, the problem it studies and the solution it offers, is the subject of this paper. 
The type of argument concerned has the following structure: There can be no entities of 
a certain kind F that are G, and there can be no entities of the same kind F that are not-
G. An argument of this type can only lead to the conclusion that there cannot be any 
entity of the kind F, provided, of course, that the premises are correct. It is here, 
however, that the difficulties begin. 
 Let us consider an example. It occurs in the first verse of chapter 21 of the 
MMK, where it is stated that there is no destruction without or together with 
production, and that there is also no production either without or together with 
destruction. OETKE draws in this connection attention to what he calls the "temporal-
atemporal ambiguity" — there is no destruction while there is production, but there 
certainly is destruction later on — and observes: "the fallacious character of the 
argument, if based on the ‘temporal-atemporal ambiguity’, is so obvious that it seems 
quite improbable that the author of the MMK should not have noticed it". Indeed, 
saying that there is no destruction without production means that there is no destruction 
that has not been preceded by production; the statement that there is not destruction 
together with production, on the other hand, means that the two do not occur 
simultaneously. OETKE then concludes: "we must either assume that Någårjuna being 
well aware of the unconclusiveness of his reasoning intended for some reason to present 
such an argument here or assume that his argument was subject to tacit presuppositions 
which either strengthened the force of the reasoning or made the aim of the proof 
weaker than it appears to be". The [30] second of these two assumptions appears to be 
the more reasonable one. The question is therefore: which are Någårjuna's tacit presup-
positions? 
                                                
* This article is the somewhat belated outcome of a seminar on Någårjuna organised by Prof. 
T._E._VETTER at Leiden University in 1979/1980. See in this connection VETTER, 1982; 1982a. 
1 See the bibliography at the end of this article. 
2 OETKE, 1990. See further OETKE, 1988: 53_f.; 1989: 10_f.; 1991: 320; 1992: 208 Anm._21. 
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 Tacit assumptions may be required to understand chapter 19 of the MMK, too. 
OETKE describes the situation as follows: "In chapter XIX Någårjuna reasons to the 
effect that time does not exist by arguing that present and future are not independent of 
the past but also not dependent because if present and future were depending on the past 
they would exist in the past, a consequence that is obviously regarded as unacceptable. 
Similar consequences exist regarding the dependence of past and present on future and 
past and future on present." OETKE then comments: "Here the reasoning seems prima 
facie absurd. ... It seems hardly conceivable that Någårjuna should have clung both to 
the thesis of the dependence between the time epochs and to the assumption concerning 
the entailment between dependence and coexistence without special reasons." Again the 
question presents itself: what were Någårjuna's special reasons? 
 It is not possible to reproduce OETKE's further analyses of the problems at hand 
in complete detail here. Let it be sufficient to note that he addresses the problems with 
admirable skill and thoroughness. In the end he solves them with what he calls the 
"hypothesis of the merger of condition-types". Någårjuna is credited with the following 
general theorem: 
 
For all x and for all y: If x is the condition of y / If x is the condition of the existence of y, then y 
must be something that exists during the existence of x (or: that does not exist exclusively later 
than x). 
 
OETKE calls this theorem P5; I will refer to it as "OETKE's theorem". 
 Applied to Någårjuna's proofs, this theorem is often able to complete them, or it 
can bridge some obvious gaps in the argumentation. Past, present and future, for exam-
ple, are conditions for each other, and must therefore, according to this theorem, exist 
simultaneously. In the case of production and destruction, too, OETKE is able to show 
that his "theorem ... and the principles that lie at its root can be exploited to account for 
the way in which the author of the MMK argues" in the relevant passage. OETKE 
mentions some other passages where the theorem might play such a role, and observes, 
quite generally, that this theorem and the related views constitute a principle that lies at 
the root of a great number of argumentative reasonings in the MMK. 
 OETKE may be right in thinking that his theorem is capable of explaining a great 
number of argumentative reasonings in the MMK. The question is however whether this 
really solves the problem. Does the solution not rather shift the problem? Isn't the falla-
cious character of the theorem so obvious that it seems quite improbable that the author 
of the MMK should not have noticed it? Is it conceivable that Någårjuna clung to it 
without special reasons? Which then were those reasons? Why should anyone accept 
such a peculiar theorem? Indeed, OETKE himself feels obliged to make the following 
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concession: "It is true that on the hypothesis that [the above theorem] and its [31] 
underlying assumptions play a key-role in the mentioned passages it would hold that the 
author of the MMK applied principles to instances that contradict their general 
validity." 
 I think that the problems discussed by OETKE can be solved differently. To 
begin with, we must recall that Någårjuna was a Buddhist. In his time many Buddhists 
had come to look upon the phenomenal world as being ultimately unreal. Objects in the 
phenomenal world were considered to have nominal existence only. OETKE himself 
describes this situation in his article "Rationalismus und Mystik in der Philosophie 
Någårjunas" in the following words:3  
 
Es ist wohlbekannt, dass in bereits relativ früher Zeit im Buddhismus die Tendenz bestand, aus 
Bestandteilen zusammengesetzten Dingen letztliche Existenz abzusprechen. Der vielleicht 
berühmteste Text, der diese Affassung (oder zumindest die Tendenz zu dieser Auffassung) 
belegen dürfte, ist der Abschnitt des Wagengleichnisses des Milindapañha. Man muss 
annehmen, dass die Ansicht, derzufolge aus Elementen konstituierten Dingen nur "nominelle", 
nicht letztliche Existenz zuerkannt werden kann, sich zur Zeit N[ågarjuna]s bei den Buddhisten 
weithin durchgesetzt hatte. Die Prinzipien, mit denen diese Art von "ontologischer Reduzierung" 
begründet wurden, finden sich nun in Texten, die von der Zeit der Entstehung des Madhyamaka 
nicht allzu weit entfernt sind, ausdrücklich genannt. 
 
OETKE uses this description of the ideas current in Någårjuna's time to make plausible 
that Någårjuna accepted the theorem which we call OETKE's theorem. These ideas can, 
however, shed more direct light on Någårjuna's arguments. 
 The phenomenal world, seen in this way, is completely determined by words. It 
is also, ultimately, unreal. Någårjuna inherited this belief, and, it appears, extended it. 
He may have been the first to draw sentences into the picture, besides individual words. 
And what he tried to do is to show that many of those sentences are somehow 
impossible, or self-contradictory. He did not, however, abandon the pan-Buddhist belief 
that words and things in the phenomenal world correspond to each other. This belief is 
rather, in an important way, his point of departure. He concludes from it that the words 
of a sentence must correspond, individually, to things in the phenomenal world. More 
precisely, the words of a sentence must correspond, one by one, to the things that 
constitute the situation described by that sentence. In the case of the sentence 
"Devadatta reads a book" there can be no doubt that this sentence describes a situation 
in which there are three things: Devadatta, his book, and the activity of reading. 
                                                
3 Cp. OETKE, 1989: 12. 
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However, in certain other cases this position gives rise to the difficulties and 
contradictions which have become Någårjuna's hallmark. In the end they supposedly 
prove that the phenomenal world is indeed ultimately unreal. 
[32] 
 Take as an example the sentence "Devadatta makes a jar" (devadatto gha†aµ 
karoti). This sentence describes a situation in which supposedly three things interact: 
Devadatta, the activity of making, and a jar. These three objects must be there, while 
and as long as the action of making a jar is in progress. But this is impossible, for at that 
time the jar is still being made, and is therefore not yet in existence. 
 This simple principle — which I have approximately described as "the words of 
a sentence must correspond, one by one, to the things that constitute the situation 
described by that sentence"; I will refer to it as the "correspondence principle" — seems 
capable of explaining many of Någårjuna's arguments. I shall limit myself to the ones 
dealt with by OETKE in connection with his theorem. 
 Before doing so, I wish to emphasize that Någårjuna's arguments concern the 
phenomenal world, not language. Since, however, he believed that the phenomenal 
world is determined by language, his arguments are often based on certain linguistic 
features. 
 Turning now to Någårjuna's arguments, consider first the first two verses of 
chapter 19 of the MMK:4  
 
If present and future existed depending on the past, (then) present and future would be in the 
past. If present and future would not be there [in the past], how would present and future be 
depending on that? 
 
This verse concerns the true statement: "Present and future depend on the past", in 
Sanskrit: pratyutpanno 'någataß ca at¥tam apek∑ya (sta˙).5 Our correspondence principle 
requires that present, future and past are there in the situation described, which is the 
phenomenal world. In other words, present and future are in the past, present and past in 
the future, and future and past in the present. 
 The discussion of production and destruction in chapter 21 of the MMK is very 
similar. It concerns the statement "destruction depends on production", or "destruction 
occurs along with production", or even "destruction necessarily follows production". 
All these statements — which apply without doubt to the phenomenal world — describe 
                                                
4 MadhK(deJ) 19.1-2: pratyutpanno 'någataß ca yady at¥tam apek∑ya hi/ pratyutpanno 'någataß ca kåle 't¥te 
bhavi∑yata˙// pratyutpanno 'någataß ca na stas tatra punar yadi/ pratyutpanno 'någataß ca syåtåµ katham 
apek∑ya tam// tr. OETKE. 
5 Note the independent use of the absolutive in MadhK(deJ) 19.1ab. 
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a situation in which destruction and production must coexist. This, however, gives rise 
to the confrontation with experience expressed in verse 5:6  
 
How should production be together with destruction? For birth and death are not found [like 
that] at one and the same time. 
[33] 
 As a further example OETKE refers to MMK 1.6:7  
 
Neither of a non-existent nor of an existent thing is a cause possible. Of what non-existent 
(thing) is there a cause, and of an existent (thing) what is the use of a cause? 
 
Seen from the point of view of the correspondence principle, there is no difficulty in 
understanding the verse. The statement "a is the cause of b" or "the effect depends on 
the cause", along with our principle, justifies the conclusion that effect and cause must 
be part of the phenomenal world. This means that the cause has an existent effect. Our 
experience, on the other hand, teaches that the effect does not exist while its cause 
exists. 
 MMK 7.2, also mentioned by OETKE to illustrate the applicability of his 
theorem, reads:8  
 
The three (characteristics) origination etc. are separately not capable of the performance of the 
characterization of the conditioned (thing); (but) how would they be together at one place at one 
time? 
 
The answer inspired by the correspondence principle is easy: these three characteristics 
are together in the phenomenal world, because they depend upon each other — 
destruction depends on origination, etc. — and because true statements can express this. 
In our experience, on the other hand, the three characteristics do not occur together. 
Once again we arrive at the contradiction, which it is Någårjuna's intention to 
demonstrate. 
 Finally there is MMK 10.11, which has a parallel in VV 42 + commentary. It 
reads:9  
                                                
6 MadhK(deJ) 21.5: saµbhavo vibhavenaiva kathaµ saha bhavi∑yati/ na janma maraˆaµ caiva 
tulyakålaµ hi vidyate// tr. OETKE. 
7 MadhK(deJ) 1.6: naivåsato naiva sata˙ pratyayo 'rthasya yujyate/ asata˙ pratyaya˙ kasya sataß ca 
pratyayena kim// tr. OETKE. 
8 MadhK(deJ) 7.2: utpådådyås trayo vyastå nålaµ lak∑aˆakarmaˆi/ saµsk®tasya samastå˙ syur ekatra 
katham ekadå// tr. OETKE. 
9 MadhK(deJ) 10.11: yo 'pek∑ya sidhyate bhåva˙ so 'siddho 'pek∑ate katham/ athåpy apek∑ate siddhas tv 
apek∑åsya na yujyate// tr. OETKE. 
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The thing that is established in dependence, how could it depend (when it is) unestablished? Or it 
depends (when it is) established — (then) its dependence is not possible. 
 
Unfortunately OETKE does not say how he makes this verse intelligible with the help of 
his theorem, and nor am I quite sure how to elucidate it with the correspondence 
principle. 
 
It is time to compare the two different types of explanations which we have considered 
so far. OETKE's theorem, as far as I can see, explains the different verses satisfactorily, 
but so does the correspondence principle. This raises the question whether OETKE's 
theorem and the correspondence principle are somehow equivalent, that they constitute 
two different ways of saying the same thing. [34] This is not however the case. It seems 
justified to think that the correspondence principle covers all cases also covered by 
OETKE's theorem, but not vice-versa. For any sentence of the type "A is the condition of 
(the existence of) B" — which expresses the realm of applicability of OETKE's theorem 
— falls automatically in the realm of the correspondence principle, which concerns all 
sentences whatsoever. Sentences that are not of the type "A is the condition of (the 
existence of) B", on the other hand, are not covered by OETKE's theorem, yet they fall 
within the realm of the correspondence principle. 
 I have already drawn attention to the fact that the correspondence principle has 
the distinct advantage of fitting in well with what we know was a generally held belief 
among the Buddhists of the time, the belief that there is a close connection between 
words and the objects of the phenomenal world. In this it contrasts sharply with 
OETKE's theorem, which makes one wonder why anyone should have accepted such a 
counterintuitive statement. We have seen that OETKE himself gave expression to similar 
doubts. In order to strengthen the case for the correspondence principle even further, we 
will discuss some cases where this principle offers a direct and obvious explanation of 
Någårjuna's argument, whereas OETKE's theorem is either of no help, or is of help only 
in a round-about, non-obvious manner. These cases, be it noted, do not prove that 
OETKE's theorem is somehow incorrect. On the contrary, this theorem, as it seems to 
me, is confirmed and strengthened by the circumstance that it appears to constitute part, 
a special case, of a wider principle accepted by Någårjuna. 
 A case where OETKE's theorem does not appear to be applicable occurs in the 
second chapter of the MMK, which proves the impossibility of going. Verse 5 reads:10  
 
                                                
10 MadhK(deJ) 2.5: gamyamånasya gamane prasaktaµ gamanadvayam/ yena tad gamyamånaµ ca yac 
cåtra gamanaµ puna˙//  
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If there is a going of [a road] that is being gone, there would be two goings: that by which the 
[road] is being gone, and again the going on it. 
 
Underlying this argument is some such sentence as "[the road] which is being gone, is 
being gone" (gamyamånaµ gamyate; cp. MMK 1d: gamyamånaµ na gamyate); 
Någårjuna appears to think that it is well-formed. In the situation described by this 
sentence, there must be two goings, for two words that refer to going figure in the 
sentence. This is what verse 5 says, and this is what we expected on the basis of the 
correspondence principle. 
 This example, more than most others, demonstrates the close connection that ex-
ists for Någårjuna between language and reality. It seems to me unlikely that OETKE's 
theorem can explain this verse, and I would be surprised to see it satisfactorily 
explained by any theorem or principle that does not take the close connection between 
language and reality into account. 
[35] 
 The theme of the two goings comes up again later on in the same chapter, this 
time in connection with the sentence "the goer goes" (gantå gacchati). Verses 22 and 23 
read:11  
 
The going by which the goer is manifested, that he does not go, because he is not prior to going. 
For someone goes something. Another going than that by which the goer is manifested, he does 
not go, because two goings cannot occur at one (single) goer. 
 
Seen from the point of view of the correspondence principle, the problem described in 
these verses is clear. Two words referring to the act of going occur in the sentence "the 
goer goes", so there should be two acts of going. Since this is impossible in the case of 
one goer, we have to decide which of the two the goer goes: is it the one that gives him 
his name ‘goer’? or is it the other one? The one that gives him his name has to precede 
him. But the going he goes must follow him, "for someone goes something". 
 Interestingly, OETKE discusses these same two verses, too. According to him, "It 
seems that the mechanism involved here consists in a remodelling of the symmetrical 
relation of bilateral implication into a non-symmetrical dependence relation between 
particulars." In a note he admits that such a transformation is not immediately obvious 
in the case of these two verses, and in his main texts he points out that it would need a 
thoroughgoing analysis of the whole chapter to substantiate his statements "which 
                                                
11 MadhK(deJ) 2.22-23: gatyå yayåjyate gantå gatiµ tåµ sa na gacchati/ yasmån na gatipËrvo 'sti kaßcid 
kiµcid dhi gacchati// gatyå yayåjyate gantå tato 'nyåµ sa na gacchati/ gat¥ dve nopapadyete yasmåd eke 
tu gantari// tr. OETKE. 
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cannot be taken up here". It is a pity that OETKE does not discuss the use of his theorem 
in the case of these two verses, for they might constitute a case where the relative merits 
of his theorem and of the correspondence principle could be compared. 
 Another case is MMK 7.17, which reads:12  
 
If any unproduced entity is found anywhere it could be produced. Since that entity does not 
exist, what is produced? 
 
This verse could be illustrated with the sentence "The jar is produced". Since this phrase 
does not, as far as I can see, refer to two objects, one of which could be the condition of 
the other, OETKE's theorem would seem to be inapplicable here. The correspondence 
principle, on the other hand, is applicable, and requires that words of this sentence must 
correspond to objects in the phenomenal world. But of course there is no jar in the 
situation described by the sentence "The jar is produced". 
 
 Having argued that the correspondence principle appears to give expression to 
Någårjuna's more or less consciously held beliefs, it is necessary to point out [36] its 
weaknesses. We formulated this principle in the following, approximate, manner: "the 
words of a sentence must correspond, one by one, to the things that constitute the 
situation described by that sentence". This formulation gives of course rise to many 
questions. Did Någårjuna really believe that there are objects in the phenomenal world 
corresponding to all words, including adverbs and other indeclinables? And even if we 
only consider nouns, adjectives and verbs, did Någårjuna really think that these three 
types of words imposed some kind of ontology upon the phenomenal world, as the 
Vaiße∑ikas did? Other questions of a similar nature could be asked, but unfortunately it 
may not be possible to find satisfactory answers to any of them. I do not think that 
Någårjuna's MMK and VV contain passages that would allow us to draw conclusions as 
to his position in matters like these. But then, he may not have worried much about the 
precise ontological structure of the phenomenal world, for the phenomenal world, for 
him, had ultimately no existence whatever, and therefore hardly merited all that much 
attention; the same is true for words, which do not really exist either. Någårjuna may 
not have been really interested in these questions, and we, modern researchers, may 
have to content ourselves with the observation that the correspondence principle, 
though incomplete and imprecise, helps us to understand Någårjuna's arguments. While 
trying to identify tacit assumptions, however, we have to take into account that the first 
                                                
12 MadhK(deJ) 7.17: yadi kaßcid anutpanno bhåva˙ saµvidyate kvacit/ utpadyeta sa kiµ tasmin bhåve 
utpadyate 'sati//. This translation follows OETKE (1992 [p._203; cp. p._210_f.]), who discusses and 
rejects the possibility of a logical error in this verse. 
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requirement is not that these assumptions look plausible to us. They should be such that 
they can reasonably be considered to look plausible to the author concerned, in this case 
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